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I.  Introduction
Bank failures are widely viewed in all countries as more damaging to the economy than
the failure of other firms of similar size for a number of reasons. The failures may produce losses
to depositors and other creditors, break long-standing bank-customers loan relationships, disrupt
the payments system, and spillover in domino fashion to other banks, financial institutions and
markets, and even to the macroeconomy (Kaufman, 1996).  Thus, bank failures are viewed as
potentially more likely to involve contagion or systemic risk than the collapse of other firms.
The risk of such actual or perceived damage is often a popular justification for explicit or
implicit government-provided or sponsored safety nets under banks, including explicit deposit
insurance and implicit government guarantees, such as "too-big-to-fail" (TBTF), that may protect
de jure uninsured depositors and possibly other bank stakeholders against some or all of the
loss.
1
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1  "Too-big-to-fail" in the United States does not imply that the bank is not failed, but that it is "too-big-to-liquidate"
or "too-big-to-impose losses on uninsured depositors" (Kaufman, 1990). This was recently reinforced by Federal
Reserve Chairman Greenspan, who said "the issue is that an organization that is very large is not too big to fail, it
may be too big to allow to implode quickly. But certainly none are too big to orderly liquidate" (Greenspan, 2000,
p.14).
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But even with such guarantees, bank failures still invoke widespread fear. In part, this
reflects a concern that protected and/or unprotected depositors may not receive full and
immediate access to their claims on the insolvent banks at the time that the institutions are
declared insolvent and placed in receivership. That is, they may suffer post-resolution losses in
addition to any loss at the time of resolution. Unprotected depositors may be required to wait
until the proceeds from the sale of the bank’s assets are received. Protected depositors may also
not be paid in full immediately if the insurance agency has no authority or procedures for
advancing payment before receipt of the sales proceeds or if there is insufficient time to collect
and process the necessary data on who are the insured depositors and how much is insured for
each depositor. If depositors are not paid the full value of their claims immediately, some or all
of the deposits are effectively temporarily "frozen". In the absence of an efficient secondary
market for frozen deposits, both protected and unprotected depositors will experience losses in
liquidity and, in addition, protected depositors will experience present value losses if they are
paid the value of their claim after the date of resolution without interest. Indeed, a European bank
analyst has recently observed that
The issue is not so much the fear of a domino effect where the failure of a large bank
would create the failure of many smaller ones; strict analysis of counterparty exposures
has reduced substantially the risk of a domino effect.  The fear is rather that the need to
close a bank for several months to value its illiquid assets would freeze a large part of
deposit and savings, causing a significant negative effect on national consumption
(Dermine, 1996, p. 680).
The potential magnitude of losses to depositors in bank failures is likely to effect both the
supply of and demand for government guarantees and to influence the resolution options
available to a deposit insurer. The larger are the potential losses in bank resolutions perceived to
be, the greater is the demand for government guarantees by depositors and other stakeholders
likely to be and the more likely are governments to bow to such political pressures and supply
the guarantees. Thus, the way depositors are treated at insolvent institutions in terms of the3
magnitude of the losses they may incur and their access to the value of their deposit claims has
important public policy implications.
This paper examines both the sources and implications of potential depositor losses in
bank resolutions, in particular depositor losses due to delays in paying both protected and
unprotected depositors at failed banks the full values of their claims in a timely fashion after a
bank is officially declared insolvent and resolved. For de facto insured depositors, the value of
their claims is the par value of the eligible deposits at the time of resolution less any explicit
deductible or loss-sharing amount.  For de facto uninsured depositors, the value of their claim is
the present value of the estimated eventual pro-rata recovery value of the bank’s assets, which is
likely to be less than the par value. Although losses to depositors in bank failures at the time of
resolution have been frequently analyzed in the literature, the implications of losses after
resolution from delayed depositor access through the freezing of insured and/or uninsured
accounts have not been thoroughly analyzed.
Because the magnitude and timing of the losses to depositors in bank insolvencies are in
large measure under the control of the deposit insurance agency or the government, the paper
develops public policy recommendations on how to minimize all losses to depositors, but in
particular the losses to depositors from delayed access to their funds after resolution. On the one
hand, if this loss could be reduced, it could contribute to reducing both the demand for and
supply of broad government guarantees, including reducing if not eliminating the need for
TBTF. In the United States, the FDIC currently pursues such a strategy. With only infrequent
exception, it effectively makes the full value of their permissible claims available to both insured
and uninsured depositors one or two business days after a bank is legally failed. Combined with
faster resolution after economic insolvency that reduces depositor losses at the time of resolution,
this strategy has made it politically possible to resolve even large insolvent banks with losses to4
uninsured depositors. But this practice is not followed in most other countries. Rather, in these
countries, both insured and uninsured depositors are paid the value of their claims only through
time after the resolution of the bank. These delays may at times stretch many months for insured
deposits and many years for uninsured deposits. As a result, to reduce the potential adverse
economic and political ramifications  damage from such additional losses to depositors,
governments in these countries are often reluctant to resolve insolvent banks with losses to
uninsured depositors and permit the banks to continue in operation by effectively protecting all
depositors.
On the other hand, reductions in potential losses and delays in payment could reduce
depositor discipline on solvent banks, thereby increasing their banks’ fragility and the probability
of failure. Thus, either corner solution appears to have drawbacks as well as advantages and an
intermediate interior solution in terms of delay time in paying depositors may be preferred in
reducing the potential damage from bank failures and maximizing aggregate economic welfare.
The paper models the tradeoffs between increased market discipline and increased probability of
government bailout as the time delay by the insurance agency in paying depositors the full value
of their claims is varied to solve for the optimal depositor access delay time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 identifies and analyzes the
sources of potential losses to depositors in bank failures. Section 3 discusses the implications of
delayed depositor access to their funds at insolvent banks in terms of the effects on depositor
discipline on the one hand and depositor pressure to protect all deposits on the other. Ways that
policy makers can reduce depositor losses from bank failures are discussed in section 4. Section
5 describes the current policies of major countries with respect to providing depositors with
access to their funds at resolved insolvent institutions and procedures available to provide
depositors with full and immediate access to their claims at the time the institutions are declared5
insolvent and placed in receivership. Particular attention is given to the procedure currently used
by the FDIC in the U.S. The access timing decision is modeled graphically in section 6 to solve
for the optimal delay time. Section 7 reports on a survey of depositor access practices across
countries conducted by the FDIC in spring 2000. The final section of the paper develops
conclusions and "best practices" recommendations regarding depositor access to their funds at
resolved insolvent institutions to enhance the safety and efficiency of banking systems.
II. Sources of Potential Losses to Depositors
Past analyses have identified four potential sources of economic losses to depositors or
the government deposit insurance agency,  which  stands  in the shoes of the de jure insured
depositors, in from the resolution of insolvent depository institutions:
1. Poor closure rule -- Embedded losses from a delay between the time when a bank
becomes economically insolvent (where the market value of the assets declines below the market
value of the liabilities -- the present value of the maturity value of the deposits and other debt)
and the time it becomes eligible to be declared legally insolvent.
2. Regulatory forbearance -- Embedded losses from a delay in the time from when a
bank becomes legally eligible to be declared insolvent and the time it is actually resolved --
declared insolvent by the regulators or other authorized party (official recognition of the
insolvency), a receiver appointed, and the existing owners removed.
3. Bad market conditions after resolution. -- Losses (gains) from delay in the receiver
selling the bank as a whole or parcels of its assets and deposits after the bank is declared legally
insolvent either because of operational problems or to wait for a better market.
4. Inefficient receiver -- Losses from delay in the receiver distributing the proceeds from
the sales to the uninsured depositors and the deposit insurance agency.6
These potential losses occur sequentially.  The first two sources of losses occur before the
date of resolution because economically insolvent banks are permitted to continue to stay open
and operate under their existing owners and managers.  The first loss arises from a poor legal
closure rule that focuses on book or regulatory values that often overstate  bank assets and
understate bank liabilities compared to their economic or market values. In the United States,
banks (although not bank holding companies), unlike other corporations, are not subject to the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy process and courts. Rather, they are resolved by their primary
federal regulator.
The second loss reflects regulatory forbearance from fear of imposing losses and injuring
favored parties associated with the insolvent bank (e.g. shareholders, management, other
employees, borrowers,  or uninsured depositors), injuring other financial institutions and the
macroeconomy, or injuring the regulators’ own reputation as public guardians against bank
failures. In addition, until the date of official recognition of the insolvency and resolution of the
bank, embedded losses from the continued operation of insolvent banks are not booked and
accrue only to the deposit insurance agency. Both insured and uninsured depositors can withdraw
their maturing funds from these banks at par value. Because they are not officially booked, the
embedded losses to the insurance agency are generally difficult for much of the public to
recognize and easy for regulators to disguise, hide, and deny. Only at and after the date of
official recognition of insolvency are the total embedded losses booked and visible to all and a
pro-rata share imposed on the remaining unprotected depositors. This encourages regulators to
delay closure. As a result, regulators are often poor agents for their principals -- healthy banks
and taxpayers. The costs of forbearance in encouraging moral hazard behavior by the banks and
increasing eventual losses to depositors in the U.S. and abroad have been amply documented7
(Kane, 1990; Kane and Yu, 1995; Kaufman, 1995 and 1997a; Barth, 1991; and Gupta and Misra,
1999).
The costs of a poor closure rule and forbearance include not only increased credit and
market losses, but also increased losses from fraud and asset stripping, which is more likely at
insolvent or near-insolvent institutions, and misallocating financial resources leading to
misallocations of real resources and reductions in aggregate economic welfare.
The final two sources of loss occur after the date of official resolution and the institution
is put in receivership.  Losses to depositors from delay in liquidating bank assets may be either or
both credit/market losses and/or present value losses.  This delay generally arises because of time
necessary to determine who are the depositors and certification of their claims and attempts,
legitimate or not, by the receiver to avoid fire-sale losses or depressing asset prices further by
selling quickly into perceived temporarily weak markets and waiting for stronger markets, from
self-dealing by the receiver, or legal obstacles that prevent the receiver from disposing of assets
quickly.  The fourth and last source of loss from delays in distributing the funds from the sale of
the bank is primarily a present value loss to depositors from operational inefficiencies.
III.  Implications of Post-Resolution Delayed Depositor Access to Funds
Unlike the two sources of losses at the date the institution is legally declared insolvent
and placed in receivership, which have been analyzed frequently, the two sources of depositor
losses afterwards have been analyzed only infrequently.  As noted earlier, at the time of
resolution, insured (protected) depositors have claims for the par value of their deposits (adjusted
for any coinsurance) at the date of resolution and uninsured (unprotected) depositors for the
present value of the estimated pro-rata recovery value of their deposits. In the absence of an
efficient secondary market, delay in offering depositors full access to their permissible funds8
decreases the liquidity and, in the absence of interest payments, also the present value of the
deposit claims and greatly intensify both public fears and actual costs of bank failures.
Moreover, the fear of such inaccessibility alone is likely to have important political as
well as economic consequences. Affected depositors are more likely to demand full and
immediate access to their funds and regulators and governments are likely to bow to the political
pressures and both delay official recognition of insolvency (forbear) and fully protect more if not
all depositors (too big to fail) if and when insolvency is finally declared. At the same time, the
government itself is likely to view any loss in depositor liquidity as potentially detrimental to the
aggregate economy and may be reluctant to permit conditions that would trigger this loss. Thus,
it may maintain insolvent institutions in operation and protect all depositors and possibly other
creditors in full. Such response further reduces market discipline and encourages additional
moral hazard behavior by the banks.
IV. Reducing Potential Losses to Depositors
The adverse effects from bank failure can be reduced by reducing losses from any or all
of the above four sources to both depositors and the deposit insurance agency.  Indeed, if
troubled banks could be resolved before the market value of their equity capital turned negative,
losses would be restricted only to shareholders. Depositors would be unharmed. Little, if any,
more serious adverse effects would then be felt from bank failures than the failure of any other
firm of comparable size.  Failures could be freely permitted to weed out the inefficient or
unlucky players. Deposit insurance would effectively be redundant. In the U.S., the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) attempts to reduce the first two
sources of losses through prompt corrective action (PCA) that both imposes a more efficient
closure rule -- 2 percent tangible equity to asset ratio -- and reduces regulatory discretion to
forbear by requiring mandatory sanctions. These include resolution, when the discretionary9
sanctions applied appear to be ineffective as reflected in a continued decline in the bank’s capital
ratio.
The third source of loss could be reduced by careful monitoring by the banking agency
that appoints the receiver of the receiver’s motivations or justification for delaying selling bank
assets. This monitoring would verify both that the probabilities are sufficiently high that relevant
asset markets are only temporarily depressed and may be expected to recover shortly and that the
assets can be managed efficiently in the meantime, so that the present value of the projected sales
proceeds to depositors and the deposit insurance agency will be higher than without a delay.
Recent experience in most countries, including the United States, suggests that delay in asset
sales, although often politically popular, rarely produce financial gains (Kane 1990 and Gupta
and Misra, 1999). Thus, it may be desirable to specify timely sales schedules. The fourth source
of loss could be reduced by requiring receivers to distribute their proceeds more quickly as they
are received and monitoring and enforcing their compliance with this policy.
V. Procedures for Immediate and Full Payment of Depositor Claims at Resolution
If losses are incurred in resolving an insolvency, governments, out of fear of depositor
bailout pressure or of systemic risk, may prefer to provide depositors with immediate and full
access to their claims at the time of resolution when the institution is legally declared insolvent
and placed in receivership. The government or deposit insurance agency can do so by advancing
funds to the affected depositors before they are received from the receiver or encourage the
development of an efficient secondary market in the claims.
The U.S. appears to be one of the very few countries that currently does not freeze
accounts at failed banks and provides all depositors immediate and full access to the value of
their claims, so that there is no loss of either liquidity or present value.
2 The FDIC advances the
                                                
2 Nevertheless, casual evidence suggests that at least some depositors are concerned that they may find their deposits10
funds.  Although it rarely receives full and immediate payment for all the assets in the resolution
of a failed bank, the FDIC typically advances the pro-rata present value of the estimated recovery
value (advance dividend payment) to all depositors at domestic offices of the bank on or about
the next business day after the official recognition of insolvency and its appointment as receiver.
Insured depositors and de jure uninsured depositors that are fully protected ex-post by the FDIC
receive access to this amount plus the amount necessary to make them whole payable either at
the bank that assumed the insured deposits of the resolved banks or, if the insured deposits are
not assumed by another bank, at the site of the failed bank operating in receivership.
3 De facto
uninsured domestic depositors receive access to the present value of the estimated recovery value
at the failed bank, unless these deposits are assumed by another bank at par value.
4 However,
since  1992, the least cost resolution provisions of FDICIA make assumptions of uninsured
deposits by another bank unlikely, unless there is no or next to no loss to the FDIC in the
transaction.
5 The FDIC can do this because it has both legal authority to advance the funds and
has solved the technical problems that underline delayed payments after resolution. To give the
FDIC sufficient time to prepare for these payments and transfers, which includes identifying the
owners and total of eligible accounts, banks are generally declared insolvent at the end of
business on Thursdays or Fridays and depositors given access to their funds on the following
Monday. This generally provides the FDIC with time to review the bank’s deposit statements and
process the information to determine each depositor’s total insured balances.
                                                                                                                                                            
at failed banks temporarily frozen.
3 In those instances where no bank acquires the insured deposits and there are a large number of depositors, the
FDIC will either arrange for a another bank to act as its deposit transfer agent or the FDIC will mail depositors
checks for the insured amounts.
4 Under the Depositor Preference Act of 1993, unsecured depositors at foreign offices of U.S. banks and other
creditors, such as Fed funds sellers, have claims junior to those of domestic depositors and, unless the "too big to
fail" provision of FDICIA is invoked, will be paid the recovery value of their claims only as the bank’s assets are
sold and all senior claimants have already been paid (Kaufman, 1997b).
5 Before FDICIA, the FDIC generally protected all depositors, including de-jure uninsured depositors, particularly at
larger banks, through merger (purchase and assumption) with another bank that assumed all deposits at par and
received a payment from the FDIC (Benston and Kaufman, 1998 and FDIC, 1998).11
Reliable estimation of recovery values of bank assets, however, generally requires longer
than a weekend.  And examiners and supervisors in the U.S. are typically provided with
additional time.  Under prompt corrective action, bank examiners and supervisors are effectively
required to progressively increase their familiarity with a bank as soon as its financial situation
deteriorates to the extent that it becomes classified as undercapitalized, including increasing the
frequency of on-site visits.  Moreover, when a bank is declared critically undercapitalized (or
even if the bank is being resolved for other reasons) by its primary federal regulator, the FDIC is
notified in advance and prepares for a possible sale of all or part of the bank to other institutions
at auction at the highest price.  To do this, it has to prepare detailed financial information on the
bank to be provided on a confidential basis to potential bidders prior to the auction and to gather
the information needed to make the determination as to which of several resolution alternatives
will be least costly to it.  Thus, the FDIC typically sends its resolutions staff into the bank some
days prior to it being closed to collect the needed information (FDIC, 1998a). The data collected
is used to arrive at both market valuations for the  assets of  the  bank and estimates of the
number and holdings of insured depositors and other creditor classes.  As a result, except in the
case of major fraud, the FDIC is able to reasonably accurately estimate recovery values before
the bank is declared legally insolvent and put in receivership and the deposits need not be frozen
after closure while the magnitude and impact of the payout is being estimated.
If, after recovery is completed, the proceeds to the FDIC exceed the amount it advanced
the uninsured depositors, the depositors are paid the difference up to the par value of their claims
plus interest. Any remainder is paid to more junior creditors and eventually to shareholders.  If
the proceeds fall short of the amount it advanced to the uninsured depositors, the FDIC bears the12
loss.  Thus, to protect itself, the FDIC advances to the uninsured depositors only a conservative
estimate of the present value of the recovery value.
6
VI.  History of Immediate and Full Payments of Depositor Claims
Immediate and full access for all depositors, or even for only ex-post protected insured
depositors, to their permissible funds has not always been the practice of federal deposit
insurance agencies in the U.S., has not been the practice of state insurance agencies in the U.S.,
and is not the current practice of deposit insurance agencies in most other countries. In large
measures, the delayed access, particularly for protected depositors, reflects the inability of the
insurance agency to advance payment to depositors before receipt from the receiver and to
collect and analyze in a timely fashion the necessary information on what balances and which
depositors are insured and on estimates of recovery values, as well as the ability to establish
paying agents quickly. The information on eligible insured deposits is complex because of,
among other things, poor and/or noncomputerized records and depositor ownership of multiple
accounts at the same bank. These obstacles provide a physical rather than a policy reason for not
providing immediate and full access to both protected and unprotected depositors.
Before the establishment of the FDIC in 1934, depositors at failed banks, even in states
with state insurance programs, were generally paid only as the assets were liquidated and funds
collected (FDIC, 1998 b and Mason, Anari, and Kolari, 2000)
7. Before the mid-1960s, the former
Federal Saving and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which insured S&L associations
before the FDIC, often disbursed funds to insured depositors at failed S&Ls only slowly through
time, and before the early 1980’s, the FDIC did not advance payments to unprotected uninsured
depositors (FDIC, 1998a).  Likewise, state governments in Ohio, Maryland, and Rhode Island,
                                                
6 Because the FDIC pays the full par amount of insured deposits, misestimates of the recovery values affect only the
final allocation of its costs, not the total cost of these payout.
7 Note holders at failed national banks were paid the par value of their notes immediately by the U.S. Treasury13
states that experienced widespread failures of perceived state insured thrift institutions in the
1980s, generally reimbursed "insured" depositors at these institutions in full, but only slowly
over a number of years, so that depositors suffered significant present value losses and liquidity
costs (Kane, 1992 and Todd, 1994). Thus, contrary to current FDIC practice, the insured
depositors were insured in future or nominal values only, not in present values.
Full and immediate depositor access also does not exist in most other countries.
8 For
example, Article 10 of the May 30, 1994 Directive of the European Union dealing with deposit-
guarantee schemes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, requires that each member country’s
national insurance agency pay insured depositors "within three months of the date on which the
competent authorities make the determination" that the bank is unable to repay its deposits in full
and deposits become unavailable to the depositors.  But, this time period may be extended for
two three-months periods to a maximum of nine months if necessary in "exceptional
circumstance."  These delay schedules appear to have been imposed to limit the maximum length
of delay from obtaining and processing the relevant deposit data and encourage faster payment
rather than to prolong delay in order to increase market discipline. No harmonizing directive
applies to the treatment of uninsured depositors and other creditors.  This is left to the laws of the
individual countries.
9 The competent authority that can declare an institution insolvent and when
it can do so also is determined by each country.  In general, private receivers are appointed to sell
or liquidate the bank.  The uninsured or unprotected claimants are paid the recovered values as
they are collected and distributed by the receiver.  In most instances, this process is not fully
                                                                                                                                                            
(FDIC, 1998b).
8 In November 2000, Nicaragua resolved its second bank 100 days and guaranteed deposits of only less than 20,000
cordobas (about $1,500) at the second bank. But only 10,000 cordobas would be paid within five days; the rest
would be paid as the bank’s assets were sold. "Angry customers gathered outside the closed branches of Bancafe
yesterday shouting ’thieves’ and ’vampires’" (Financial Times, 2000). As discussed later, only two (Canada and Peru)
of the 25 countries other than the U.S. that responded to a survey by the FDIC and that had experienced at least one
bank failure since 1980 reported paying its insured depositors immediately.
9 Only three countries in the FDIC survey (Canada, Japan, and Slovenia) report having authority to advance funds to14
completed for many years, so that the depositors do not have access to the full recovery value of
their claims for an equal number of years.  As a result, both the insured and, particularly,
uninsured depositors attempt, often successfully, to exert political pressure on their government
to delay declaring the bank insolvent and to make most if not all depositors whole when it does.
Both outcomes are costly and inefficient. TBTF or broader appears alive and well in most
countries outside the U.S.!
VII.  Disadvantages of Immediate and Full Payment of Depositor Claims
But providing immediate depositor access to the full value of their permissible funds may
have an important disadvantage as well as advantages and, thus, be a two-sided sword.  It may
reduce market discipline on the banks.  Knowing that they may have to wait, and at times a
lengthy wait, to gain access to the full value of their claims after resolution and thus suffer
liquidity and possibly present value losses in addition to any other losses unprotected depositors
may incur, may provide both insured and uninsured depositors greater incentive both to monitor
the financial health of their banks and to discipline them when necessary by charging higher
interest rates commensurate with the greater perceived risk or transferring their deposits
(running) to perceived safer banks. In addition, under full and immediate access, any unexpected
losses from delays in asset sales and distribution of the sales’ proceeds will accrue to the deposit
insurer rather than to the uninsured depositors.  This would further  reduce the incentive for
unprotected depositors to monitor their banks. The tradeoff between the advantages and this
disadvantages of full and immediate access is modeled in the next section to examine the
implications more carefully and to identify the optimal time delay in providing depositors with
full access.
VIII. Modeling the Access Delay Decision
                                                                                                                                                            
uninsured depositors at failed banks, but few countries responded to this question.15
As discussed above, the primary basis for reducing the cost of failure to depositors by
advancing them funds immediately after a bank failure is to minimize the economic disruption
that can result from the loss of liquidity associated with freezing deposits.  However, there is a
clear trade-off with market discipline.  The greater the perceived loss that depositors may
potentially suffer, the greater is the incentive for them to monitor the condition of their bank and
discipline the bank for taking excessive risks, either by withdrawing funds or requiring higher
interest rates to compensate for the increased risk.  Given this trade-off, the problem is to solve
for the optimal time distribution of payments on given depositor claims on a failed bank,
assuming that the resolution loss is fixed at the time of failure. This tradeoff can be modeled
graphically. Because the government can affect, if not set, the delay time, including the time
necessary to process the relevant deposit data and estimate the recovery values, it is effectively
serves as a policy tool.
The model is shown in Figure 1. The time delay set by the insurance agency after the
resolution of insolvent institutions in providing depositors with full access to their claims (PD) is
measured on the horizontal axis. Assuming a given loss at the time of resolution, the additional
market discipline (AMD) from delayed payment resulting in possible present value losses to
protected depositors and liquidity losses to unprotected depositors is measured on the vertical
scale. AMD may be expected to increase with delay time. Likewise, bailout pressure (BOP) is
also measured on the vertical axis. BOP may also be expected to increase with delay time. As
long as AMD increases with delay time faster than BOP initially and then more slowly, as
appears reasonably, so that the two schedules intersect, tradeoffs will result and an optimal delay
time derived. As drawn in Figure 1, the optimum delay time is Q. For shorter delay times -- to
the left of Q--, enhanced market discipline is greater than bailout pressure and for longer delay
times -- to the right of Q -- bailout pressure more than offsets increased market discipline.  As16
noted above, it appears reasonable that the slopes of both the AMD and BOP schedules are
affected by the magnitude of the losses at resolution when the institution is placed in receivership
(sum of losses from sources one and two). In particular, the slope of the BOP schedule may be
expected to become steeper with increases in losses at resolution, so that pressures for bailout
rise quickly above gains from increased market discipline. Indeed, if the slope of the BOP
schedule is sufficiently steep at the beginning, the optimal PD = 0. If inability to advance
payment or technical problems prevent the government from providing depositors with access at
the optimal time, the government is likely to bailout all depositors at resolution. This reinforces
the importance of both resolving institutions as quickly as possible with no or minimum loss and
developing faster procedures for certifying protected deposits and estimating recovery values. It
follows that by providing depositors with immediate and full access to their claims, as described
in section 5, the U.S. implicitly assumes that bailout pressures immediately exceed gains from
additional market discipline.
IX.  The FDIC Survey of Depositor Access Practices Across Countries
In February 2000, the FDIC surveyed 78 deposit insurers in 64 countries outside the U.S.
The countries chosen were those that had explicit deposit insurance schemes in place.  Thirty-
seven surveys were returned providing insight into the deposit insurance practices of 34
countries.  While the surveys covered a wide range of deposit insurance practices, this paper
examines only that portion of the survey relating to the availability of funds to depositors after a
bank has been declared insolvent and differences in the treatment of insured and uninsured
depositors.
When examining fund availability practices one must recognize the difference between
policy intent and practice.  A deposit insurer may wish to pay quickly, but not have the technical
or informational capacity to do so.  Conversely, they could believe in instilling market discipline17
by imposing costs on depositors through delay in making funds available, but not have the
political resolve to carry out such a policy.  Consequently, only the 30 responding countries that
had actually experienced bank failures since 1980 were analyzed.  Of these, three (Bahrain,
Jamaica, and Sweden) did not specify a time frame within which they had paid depositors, since
the failures occurred prior to the creation of a deposit insurance scheme.
Insured Deposits
As can be seen in Table 1, two countries (Japan and Italy) provided immediate and full
payment of insured deposits and one (Peru) immediate but not always full payment.  Japan has
protected all depositors in those banks it has declared insolvent and used resolution techniques
that provided for immediate access to funds. In Italy, the Interbank Deposit Protection Fund also
provided insured depositors with immediate access to their insured deposits. Peruvian depositors
have had access to some but not all of their insured deposits in some failures the day after failure
e.g., in the most recent failure in November 1999. But in other failures, the depositors have had
to wait as long as eight months for even the initial payment.  According to the Peruvian Deposit
Insurance Fund, the factors that determine the speed within which insured depositors get access
to their funds are the potential systemic effects that would be triggered by the failure of a specific
bank and the quality of information given to the insurer by the liquidation agency.  Five other
countries gave insured depositors access to their funds within one month of the failure and the
majority of all respondents followed the EU guidelines and gave insured depositors access within
no more than three months.
The Isle of Man Financial Supervision Commission was still in the process of attempting
to pay off insured depositors more than six months after the failure of a bank last year.  Three
other countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Greece, reported that they were able to make
funds available to insured depositors within six months.  It is interesting to note that almost all of18
the respondents provided insured depositors with all their funds at one time.  Only the deposit
insurers in Italy, Austria, Latvia, and Peru paid in installments.
The responses from Peru, and the experience of the Isle of Man, suggest that much of the
reason for the delay in paying insured depositors may not be a conscious policy of promoting
insured depositor discipline. Rather, it reflects the practical need for delay from the technical
difficulties associated with paying off a bank quickly.
Uninsured Deposits
The survey results, presented in Table 2, clearly indicate that the practice of advancing
funds to uninsured depositors is unique to the United States.  Twenty-three of the respondents
indicated that uninsured depositors cannot be fully protected in their countries and only three
deposit insurers (Canada, Japan, and Slovakia) indicated that they had the power to advance
funds to cover uninsured depositors.
The timing of availability of funds to uninsured depositors is typically dependant on the
type of resolution.  Japan and Tanzania are notable examples of countries that have used
resolution techniques to protect all depositors.  In other countries, such as Italy and Brazil,
uninsured depositors have immediate access to their deposits if a resolution results in the transfer
of these deposits to another financial institution.  In most countries, unprotected depositors will
have to wait for the liquidation process to yield sufficient cash for payments to be made to them
and the practices surrounding the liquidation of assets and payment of claims follows the
national practices for bankruptcy, with discretion being vested with the courts or the liquidator,
receiver, or administrator for the failed bank estate.  In all cases where the uninsured depositors
were dependent on a liquidation process for their proceeds, they received access to their funds in
installments.19
A review of the comments received from the respondents suggest that, while most deposit
insurers have no discretion to protect uninsured depositors in liquidations or to advance funds
from their deposit insurance funds to uninsured depositors, they can use resolution strategies that
protect uninsured depositors.  This suggests that these countries will probably resort to too-big-
to-fail resolution strategies, nationalization of the bank (in whole or in part), and/or extend
blanket guarantees to depositors while the insolvent bank continues in operation.
X. Summary and Best Practices Recommendation Conclusions
This paper identifies and analyses the four potential sources of losses in bank failures two
at the time an insolvent bank is resolved and placed in receivership and two afterwards. The two
sources of post-resolution losses arise from delayed payment of depositor claims. The effective
freezing of some or all of the deposits by the deposit insurance agency until reliable data are
available on what deposits and depositors are protected and/or the proceeds from the sale of bank
assets are received has two conflicting effects. On the one hand, fear of delayed payment
increases depositor monitoring and discipline. On the other hand, fear of delayed payment
increases depositor pressures for protection and government willingness to provide such
protection to reduce the chances of systemic risk.
This paper models these effects for a given loss from delayed resolution and solves for
the optimal delay time that equates the gains from additional market discipline with the losses
from increased bailout pressure. Different countries follow different practices with respect to
delaying payment with different consequences for market discipline and resolution policies. In
the U.S., the FDIC does not freeze deposits at resolved institutions. Rather, it advances the
proceeds to depositors before it, acting as the receiver, collects them from asset sales. Thus,
insured depositors receive near immediate payment of the par value of their deposits and20
uninsured depositors receive near immediate payment of the present value of their pro-rata share
of the estimated recovery value. This practice may reduce market discipline, but is likely to
reduce pressures for bailout by more. Thus, given the loss at resolution, insolvent institutions are
more  likely to  be resolved and uninsured depositors not protected.  In contrast, most other
countries freeze deposits and delay payments to both insured and uninsured depositors,
according to a schedule or until the funds are collected from asset sales, both because of the
inability to estimate quickly the amount that needs to be paid out and because of restrictions on
advancing funds before collection of the sales proceeds.
These differences in the treatment of depositors at insolvent institutions have important
implications for a country’s bank resolution practices, in particular, for banks considered too-big-
to-fail. The smaller the overall loss in bank failures, the easier it is economically and politically
to resolve insolvencies with losses to de jure unprotected depositors. In the U.S., if regulatory
prompt corrective action is successful in limiting losses (negative net worth) at insolvent
institutions to relatively small percentage amounts, say, to not more than 5 percent of assets at
large banks (the loss experienced by the Continental Illinois National Bank in 1984 was near 3
percent), and uninsured depositors have immediate and full access to their funds, losses to large
uninsured depositors should be restricted to a loss rate that is well within the boundaries that
most of these depositors can tolerate without panicking, e.g. losses they appear to be willing to
bear in investments in commercial paper or other short-term debt instruments.  Moreover, since
enactment of depositor preference, which subordinates deposits at foreign offices and other
creditors to domestic deposits and the FDIC, losses at failed banks can be charged to these
accounts before domestic depositors. Thus, losses to domestic depositors and the FDIC may be
even smaller. As a result, if the losses are both small and access to the remaining deposits is
immediate, uninsured depositors are less likely to exert political pressure on the government to21
extend the safety-net to them, and to be made whole, and governments are less fearful of
systemic risk and too-big-to-fail protection may be thus be avoided. The combination of the
FDIC’s payment practices and the improved closure rule under FDICIA helps to explain why
uninsured depositors at almost all recent failed banks in which the FDIC suffered losses have
been required to share pro-rata in the losses (Benston and Kaufman, 1998). But, because no large
money center bank has failed since FDICIA, it is too early to declare TBTF dead in the U.S.
In contrast, because losses in resolving insolvencies are not necessarily minimized and
uninsured deposits are often frozen until payment is received from private receivers, most other
countries find it difficult to resolve large insolvent banks with losses to depositors.  They are thus
under great pressure to protect all depositors and are fearful of igniting systemic risk if they do
not. Thus, TBTF appears to be alive and healthy in these countries and large taxpayer losses in
bank failures may be expected to continue.
Because cross-country differences in access of insured depositors to their funds affects
both the intensity of market discipline and the probability of bailout, cross-country studies of the
effectiveness and efficiency of alternative deposit insurance structures that specify the existence
of such programs, or differentiate between explicit and implicit programs, only by a single
yes/no (or 1/0) variable, and thus omit reference to access delay, are likely to be incomplete and
inaccurate.
10
The analysis in this paper suggests that the best strategy for achieving aggregate bank
stability, characterized by efficient exit of inefficient or unlucky banks through failure at no or
least cost to the economy, involves resolving these banks before or shortly after their net worth
turns negative and providing full and immediate or near-immediate access for insured depositors
                                                
10 For example, a recent study by Demiriguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) reports finding evidence of some market
discipline on banks in countries that have government provided safety-nets, but does not mention delays in payment
as one of the possible reasons.22
to the par value of their deposits and for uninsured depositors to the present value of their pro-
rata share of the estimated recovery value. Such a strategy minimizes the potential for systemic
risk and permits otherwise TBTF banks to be resolved just like any other insolvent bank.
However, the ability to provide full and immediate or near-immediate depositor access may be
constrained both by lack of legal authority for regulators to advance payment to depositors
before receipt of the funds from asset sales from the receivers and by physical problems that
interfere with this outcome, such as the unavailability of accurate and accessible account data
and facilities for speedy analysis of the data and inability to estimate recovery values accurately
and quickly. If this is the optimal policy, procedures for reducing the delays caused by these
problems in each country need to be addressed.23
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PD = Payment Delay Time
AMD = Additional Market Discipline





Funds Availability of Insured Deposits
(countries with at least one insolvent bank since 1980)















Austria (1) YES       yes     Installments
Bahrain* NO           
Belgium YES     yes       All at one time
Brazil NO     yes       All at one time
Canada NO       yes     All at one time
Czech Republic YES         yes   All at one time
France YES       yes     All at one time
Germany (1) NO       yes     All at one time
Greece YES         yes   All at one time
Hungary NO       yes     All at one time
Isle of Man NO           yes All at one time
Italy (1) YES yes           Installments
Italy (2) YES       yes     Installments
Jamaica* YES           
Japan NO           
Latvia NO          Installments
Lithuania YES       yes     All at one time
Netherlands YES       yes     All at one time
Nigeria NO           
Peru YES yes         Installments
Poland YES         yes   All at one time
Romania YES       yes     All at one time
Slovakia YES     yes       All at one time
Spain YES     yes       All at one time
Sweden* YES           
Tanzania NO     yes       All at one time
Trinidad and Tobago YES       yes     All at one time
Turkey NO       yes     All at one time
Uganda YES       yes   All at one time
United Kingdom     yes   All at one time
  
*denotes countries whose failures occurred prior to the establishment of the current deposit insurance scheme
Funds Availability of Insured Deposits
(countries without insolvent banks since 1980)















Austria  (2) YES           
El  Salvador YES           
Germany  (2) YES           
Mexico YES           
Oman YES           
Portugal YES           
T a i w a n N O           Table 2
Funds Availability of Uninsured Deposits
(countries with at least one insolvent bank since 1980)















Austria (1) YES NO  5-6 months Installments NO
Bahrain* YES NO      YES
Belgium NO NO several months Installments NO
Brazil YES NO Dependent of the intervention process Installments YES
Canada YES YES YES not permitted neither YES
Czech Republic YES NO No bankruptcy proceedings have been finished yet.
Germany (1) NO NO NO     YES
France YES NO    Installments NO
Greece NO NO Installments
Hungary YES NO  2 years Installments YES
Isle of Man NO NO YES
Italy (1) YES YES    In case of assignments of assets and liabilities to another
depository institution, they may have immediate access to
their deposits; otherwise they have to wait the receiver
allocates the bank’s liquidated assets




Jamaica* YES NO  
Japan YES YES YES All deposits have so far been protected. NO
Latvia NO NO Installments NO
Lithuania YES NO 12 months Installments YES
Netherlands NO YES   This is done under normal bankruptcy laws between the
receiver and the uninsured depositors.  If funds are
available for creditors of their rank, they will be paid out in
due course.
Installments YES
Nigeria NO YES   There is no provision for depositors of insolvent banks to
be paid from the Deposit Insurance Fund.
YES
Peru YES YES NO  0-1 year Installments YES
Poland YES YES NO  Installments YES
Romania YES NO
Slovakia YES YES YES No case. NO
Spain YES YES approximately 12 months Installments YES
Sweden* NO NO  
Tanzania NO YES NO In our experience:  There was full compensation and the
depositors had access to their deposits within the shortest
period available.
All at one time NO
Trinidad and Tobago YES NO Whenever there is sufficient funds from the realization of
assets available for making distributions.
Installments YES
Turkey NO Since 1980, depositors were not able to access the+A37ir
explicitly uninsured deposits.
All at one time
Uganda YES NO   
United Kingdom NO Handled by liquidators or administrators
  
*denotes countries whose failures occurred prior to the establishment of the current deposit insurance scheme
Funds Availability of Uninsured Deposits
(countries without insolvent banks since 1980)















Austria (2) YES NO No bank failure YES
El Salvador YES NO NO there were bank failures but we did not have the insured
deposits system
All at one time NO
Germany (2) NO YES   no bank failures
Mexico NO NO In Taiwan, the competent authority, the Ministry of
Finance, has never issued an order to close a financial
institution during the past 15 years.
YES
Oman YES NO  
Portugal YES NO No explicitly uninsured depositors prior to 1999. NO
Taiwan NO NO NO  Installments YES
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